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In recent years, the EU has moved its focus away from enlargement towards greater
integration, especially in fiscal matters. This also comes at a time when the UK is seeking to
renegotiate its relationship with the EU, and as the likelihood of Turkey joining the EU as a full
member is increasingly remote. In light of these challenges, Andrew Duff MEP proposes a
new type of associate membership, where countries would agree to the EU’s values, but not to
all its activities or political objectives. This, he argues, would give some countries a
springboard towards membership, and others, an alternative to it. To do nothing instead, he
writes, would pose risks that any future treaty changes would be blocked by one or other
member state.
The European Union is steadying itself  to deepen its integration, especially in f iscal matters. In all
probability, a Convention will be called in spring 2015 to codif y in EU treaty f orm the measures undertaken
by way of  crisis management in the course of  the current recession (including the incorporation of  the
Fiscal Compact Treaty), as well as to rectif y some of  the mistakes made in the Lisbon treaty. A large
majority of  the governments of  the member states of  the Union, the European Commission and the
European Parliament will support that general approach.
At the same time, with the exception of  Iceland, the prospect of  new member states joining the Union is
remote. Turkey appears to have changed its mind about accession, not least because the problem of
Cyprus remains intractable, but also because the ruling party is more and more overtly Islamic in its
orientation. There is in any case no prospect of  an agreement among the EU’s member states about
accepting Turkey as a f ull member.
Although they keep the aspiration to join the Union, no country in the Western Balkans is ready to assume
the responsibilit ies of  EU membership f or many years. None are f ree of  systemic corruption or of  security
problems with their neighbours. All will require a longer t ime f or deeper preparation f or EU accession than
was available f or Romania or Bulgaria – or, f or that matter, Croatia.
So, as the f ederal process quickens within the Union, the threshold is raised f or all prospective f uture
members. It is important that all candidate states are made aware of  the likely changing nature of  the Union
which they aspire to join. The Treaty of  Lisbon is no longer the benchmark.
Equally, one large member state, the United Kingdom, has called f or a renegotiation of  its own terms of
membership of  the Union in the hope of  loosening the ties that bind. The UK, which will have to approve the
revised treaty in a ref erendum, has the legal right to veto deeper integration f or everyone else. Even if  the
Conservative Party is not a member of  the next Brit ish government, f oreseen in spring 2015, there will be
f ew in Britain ready and willing to campaign f or UK membership of  the f ederal union ‑ which involves, above
all and in the f irst instance, sterling joining the single currency.
Multi-Tier Governance
Despite these strong centrif ugal f orces, it is in everyone’s interests that the European Union which
emerges f rom its present troubles is capable of  providing a pole of  stability, liberty and prosperity on a
continental scale. This matters f or Britain just as much as f or Eastern Europe. There is a similar perception
of  the need f or a strong Europe in the suddenly volatile Mediterranean, and across the crisis-ridden Middle
East.
In the past, it has been assumed that all current and f uture states of  the Union can proceed along the
same chosen path, albeit at dif f erent speeds. Palpably, this is no longer the case. The Treaty of  Lisbon ‑
itself  bastardised by the f ailure of  the earlier constitutional treaty ‑ may prove to have been the last treaty
designed to corral all member states.
It is theref ore wise and timely to use this crit ical situation to introduce the EU to more sophisticated multi-
t ier arrangements. Although some elements of  more dif f erentiated integration can be rendered by using the
enhanced cooperation provisions of  the Lisbon treaty, a more radical change is needed if  the variable
geometry with which we are now f aced is to have solid constitutional legit imacy.
The Brits, the Turks and the Rest
Over the years, the UK has won a large number of  opt-outs and derogations f rom the core of  the acquis
communautaire, and has managed to install a number of  emergency brakes into the institutional
procedures. It declines to join the euro or Schengen. It now wants even less Europe. Prime minister David
Cameron is demanding the repatriation of  powers and competences f rom Brussels to London. These
demands, which are to be spelled out unilaterally by the coalit ion government at the end of  2014, are sure
to jeopardise the cohesion of  the single market and the integrity of  EU law.
The UK government is already prepared, as no previous Brit ish administration has been, to absent itself
f rom the Council table when matters of  f iscal union are being negotiated. It has also declined to participate
in the single supervisory mechanism of  the banking union. The Brit ish Conservatives want f ewer rights f rom
the Union in exchange f or f ewer duties. At the same time, Tory leaders preach across the Channel about
‘the remorseless logic of  f iscal union’, and encourage other EU countries to go f orward to deeper
integration without the UK. Missing the point, the Labour leadership accuses the Tories of  sleep-walking
towards the exit. In f act, the Tories are wide awake and have f ound the emergency stairway.
At the other end of  Europe, the Turks mull over a new f orm of  relationship with the EU (and with NATO).
The old nostrum of  a ‘privileged partnership’ outside the Union is clearly unacceptable to Ankara, not least
because it was always dif f icult to f ind much privilege in what was always a highly ambiguous concept.
(Turkey has had a customs union with the EU since 1995.) Ministers of  the ruling AKP make it clear that
Turkey is not prepared to pool national sovereignty with the Europeans to anything like the extent that will
be required by the more f ederal EU. Like the Brit ish, the Turks want to opt out of  the euro. Like the Brit ish,
the Turks want of  Europe a common market and a security relationship. Neither the Turks nor the Brits
seem to like European f undamental rights. It does not go unnoticed that the UK is the strongest advocate
of  Turkey’s membership of  the EU, but the suspicion is rif e that the Brit ish Tories want f urther enlargement
mainly in order to dilute f urther integration.
Prime minister Recep Tayip Erdogan cannot bring himself  to admit that anything other than f ull membership
is acceptable (while declining to do the things needed to bring it about). However, f oreign minister Ahmet
Davutoglu and other ministers are more subtle, and f avour openly a reappraisal of  EU relations. Turkey’s
opposition parties, adhering more to the classic state ideology of  Kemalism, are ill-equipped to be
ambassadors of  EU enlargement. Meanwhile, Kemal Dervis, Turkey’s global statesman, pref ers to talk of  an
‘organised diversity’ of  the EU within which Turkey would f ind a durable and respectable place as an
associate member.
There is a third category of  European state f or which a new class of  associate membership might prove to
be an irresistible of f er. Under the current arrangements of  the European Economic Area, Iceland, Norway
and Liechtenstein have the status of  virtual member states of  the Union without any of  the polit ical
trappings or institutional connections of  a f ull member state. This is unsatisf actory and unstable both f or
the EEA states and f or the EU. Iceland is negotiating f ull accession. Norway is seeking to upgrade the
terms and conditions of  its partnership with the Union short of  f ull accession.
The Swiss, who declined even to accept EEA membership, have an even worse deal, t ied untidily, as they
are, to a number of  bilateral deals to the EU’s internal market. The EU is right to insist that if  Switzerland
and the sovereign micro-states of  Andorra, Monaco and San Marino wish to continue to benef it f rom the
f ruits of  European integration to which they do not contribute, they must at least agree to recognise the
supranational jurisdiction of  the European Court of  Justice over that which they agree in common.
How To Do It
Article 49 of  the Treaty on European Union lays down how a European state can become a member. In the
Treaty of  Lisbon we inserted a new clause, Article 50, which allows f or a member state to negotiate its
secession f rom the Union. This was a natural ref inement of  the constitutional order of  the Union at a
moment when it decided to take a signif icant, if  incomplete, step in the f ederal direction. Member states
have the sovereign right to choose not to continue their membership as and when the Union as a whole
takes on new f orms and has new competences conf erred upon it.
At the next general revision of  the treaties, starting in 2015, another new clause might be added in order to
establish the f ormal category of  an associate state of  the Union. We can call this Article 49a. Associate
membership would require f idelity to the values and principles of  the Union (Article 2 TEU) and to the
principle of  sincere cooperation (Article 4(3)). However, it would not require adherence to all the polit ical
objectives of  the Union as laid down in Article 3, which include joining the euro. Nor would associate
membership conf er the duty to engage in all the activit ies of  the EU.
For some, associate membership would be a spring board f or f ull accession; f or others, a long stay parking
place; and f or yet others a decent alternative to leaving the Union altogether. The f orm and conditions of
the associate membership would need to be negotiated on a case by case basis, and would be determined
by the dynamics, as it were, of  whether a state was coming or going. Participation by the associate member
state in the EU institutions would necessarily be limited, and would vary relative to the degree of  EU
regulation agreed. The customs union would be at the heart of  the association. Each association
agreement would specif y in which of  the Union’s policies and f unctions the state is to participate, and the
terms and conditions, f inancial and institutional, applying to that participation.
Participation by an associate state in the internal market, in whole or in part, should not risk the operation
of  the internal market. Nor should its participation in the external action of  the Union or in an international
agreement of  the Union prejudice the cohesion or limit the scope of  the Union’s posit ion. Associate states
may have contractual arrangements with the Commission or the agencies of  the Union f or the delivery of
policy in certain specif ied f ields. These arrangements will contain reciprocal rights and obligations as well
as the possibility of  undertaking activit ies jointly.
As f ar as institutional arrangements are concerned, there could be an annual meeting of  the European
Council and the heads of  state or of  government of  the associate states. Representatives of  the national
parliaments of  associate states could have observer status at the European Parliament. Representatives
of  associate state governments would have observer status in the Council as and when the agenda of  the
Council meeting relates to a policy area in which the associate state participates. Associate states should
also be included in the relevant consultative processes of  the European Commission and in appropriate
working groups of  the Council. They should participate as observers in the comitology which disposes of
delegated acts.
Associate states would acknowledge the jurisdiction of  the Court of  Justice, and could intervene in cases
bef ore the Court. They would be able to institute third-party proceedings to contest a judgment, where the
judgment is prejudicial to their rights. They should nominate judges to the General Court on the same terms
and conditions, and according to the same procedures, as a judge nominated by a member state.
The Alternative
There will be many who baulk at making such a radical change to the structure of  EU membership. The
alternative, of  course, is not to do so but to try once again to advance constitutional ref orm by, with and
f or all member states. Yet nobody should underestimate the risk, in that case, that one or other existing
member state will block the revised treaty either at its negotiation or during its ratif ication. Endless
concessions by those who need more Europe towards those who want less Europe in an attempt to buy
of f  hostility to the f ederal package are also unlikely to achieve an optimum result. Appeasement of
eurosceptics tends to be in vain.
Likewise, to condemn the Union and a large number of  potential candidate countries to ever more complex,
long-winded and challenging accession negotiations will not be edif ying f or either party, and will be
destabilising.
Another option is f or more states to join the European Economic Area. But this is unattractive f or several
reasons. First, the EEA has obvious democratic def iciencies, and does not allow its members to shape EU
policy in any way whatsoever. Second, the EEA is unsuitable f or states which need EU f inancial help: indeed,
EEA membership means being a net contributor to the EU budget while receiving no benef it f rom the CAP or
structural f unds. Third, a prerequisite of  the EEA is a mature self -suf f icient administration in order to apply
the acquis, making it at least plausible f or EFTA countries but very much less so, f or example, f or the
Balkans.
So the Convention in 2015 needs to craf t something other than privileged partnership outside the Union,
something more than the EEA, yet something less than f ull membership. The European Union has proved
itself  over the years capable of  great constitutional ingenuity, and it is reasonable to assume that, given
the polit ical will to work together f or the good of  all Europe, it can continue to do so.
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